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Abstract. Competition networks are formed via adversarial interactions between actors. The
Dynamic Competition Hypothesis predicts that influential actors in competition networks
should have a large number of common out-neighbors with many other nodes. We empirically
study this idea as a centrality score and find the measure predictive of importance in several
real-world networks including food webs, conflict networks, and voting data from Survivor.
1 Introduction
While social networks are often studied from the perspective of positive interactions such as friend-
ship or followers, the impact of negative social interaction on their structure and evolution cannot
be ignored. Structural balance theory posits positive and negative ties between actors in social
networks, and assumes such signed networks will stabilize so that triples of actors are either all
mutually friends or possess common adversaries; see [12], and [9] for a modern treatment. The pre-
diction of the signs of edges in a social network was previously studied [15,18,21]. Further, negative
interactions as a model for edges was studied in the context of negatively correlated stocks in mar-
ket graphs [4], and in the spatial location of cities as a model to predict the rise of conflicts and
violence [11]. Even in the highly cited Zachary Karate club network [22], the negative interaction
between the administrator and instructor was the impetus for the split of the club participants into
two communities. We propose that competition or negative interactions are critically important to
the study of social networks and more broadly, real-world complex networks, and are often hidden
drivers of link formation.
In [6], we investigated properties inherent in social networks of competitors that evolve dynam-
ically over time. Such networks are viewed as directed, where a directed edge from nodes u to v
corresponds to some kind of negative social interaction. For example, a directed edge may represent
a vote by one player for another in a social game such as the television program Survivor. Directed
edges are added over discrete time-steps in what we call dynamic competition networks. Our main
contribution in [6] was the presentation of a hypothesis, referred to as the Dynamic Competition
Hypothesis, or (DCH), that served as a predictive tool to uncover alliances and leaders within dy-
namic competition networks. We provided evidence for the hypothesis using U.S. voting record data
from 35 seasons of Survivor.
In the present paper, we focus on a particular implication of the DCH. Namely, the DCH pre-
dicts that leaders and central actors in these networks should have large a large number of common
out-neighbors with other nodes in the network. Consequently, this score should constitute a more
accurate and interesting centrality score in competition networks where edges have a negative con-
notation. We study this score in terms of its ranking of leaders in various kinds of networks ranging
from additional international seasons of Survivor, to conflict networks, and to food webs.
We organize the discussion in this paper as follows. In Section 2, we formally define dynamic
competition networks, and review the DCH as stated in [6], with a focus on the common out-neighbor
scores, called CON scores. In Section 3, we investigate using CON scores as centrality measures in
three distinct sources: i) voting data from all international (that is, non-U.S.) seasons of Survivor,
ii) from conflict networks arising from the countries of Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and iii)
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in 14 food webs. We find that the CON scores predict influential actors in the networks with high
precision. The final section interprets our results for real-world complex networks, and suggests
further directions.
We consider directed graphs with multiple directed edges throughout the paper. Additional
background on graph theory and complex networks may be found in the book [5] or [7].
2 The Dynamic Competition Hypothesis
The Dynamic Competition Hypothesis (DCH) provides a quantitative framework for the structure
of dynamic competition networks. We recall the statement of the DCH as first stated in [6]. Before
we state the DCH, we present some terminology.
A competition network G is one where nodes represent actors, and there is directed edge between
nodes u and v in G if actor u is in competition with actor v. A dynamic competition network is a
competition network where directed edges are added over discrete time-steps. For example, nodes
may consist of individuals and edges correspond to conflicts between them; as another example,
we may consider species in an ecological community, and directed edges correspond to predation.
Observe that dynamic competition networks may have multiple edges if there were multiple conflicts;
further, not all edges need be present.
The central piece of the DCH we study here are the common out-neighbor scores. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the node correspond to integers such that we can use the nodes to address
an adjacency matrix as well. Consequently, let A be the adjacency matrix of given competition
network. Entries in the matrix are 0 or positive integers for the number of competition interactions.
For nodes u, v, and w, we say that w is a common out-neighbor of u and v if (u,w) and (v, w) are
directed edges. Alternatively, AuvAvw ≥ 1. For a pair of distinct nodes u, v, we define CON(u, v)
to be the number of common out-neighbors of u and v. Note that this common out-neighbor score
counts multiplicities based on the minimum number of interactions: CON(u, v) =
∑
k min(Auk, Avk),
which corresponds to a multiset intersection. For a fixed node u, define
CON(u) =
∑
v∈V (G)
CON(u, v).
We call CON(u) the CON score of u. For a set of nodes S with at least two nodes, we define
CON(S) =
∑
u,v∈S
CON(u, v).
Observe that CON(S) is a non-negative integer.
In the DCH, leaders are defined as members of a competition network with high standing in
the network, and edges emanating from leaders may influence edge creation in other actors. In the
context of conflict networks within a country, leaders may be actors who exert the strongest political
influence within the country; note that these may not be the largest or most powerful actors. As
another example, leaders in a food web would naturally have higher trophic levels (that is, higher
position in a food chain). The DCH characterizes leaders as those nodes with high CON scores, low
in-degree, high out-degree and high closeness. Recall that for a strongly connected digraph G and a
node v, we define the closeness of u by
C(u) =
 ∑
v∈V (G)\{u}
d(u, v)
−1
where d(u, v) corresponds to the distance measured by one-way, directed paths from u to v.
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In this paper, we focus on the implication that leaders in competition networks should have high
CON scores, which suggests this is a natural centrality measure for these networks. The DCH also
involves the notion of alliances, that does not factor into our present study. Alliances are defined as
groups of agents who pool capital towards mutual goals. In the context of social game shows such as
Survivor, alliances are groups of players who work together to vote off players outside the alliance.
Members of an alliance are typically less likely to vote for each other, and this is the case in strong
alliances. This is characterized in terms of near independent sets; see [6] for the formalism.
In summary, the Dynamic Competition Hypothesis (or DCH ) asserts that dynamic competition
networks satisfy the following four properties.
1. Alliances are near independent sets.
2. Strong alliances have low edge density.
3. Members of an alliance with high CON scores are more likely leaders.
4. Leaders exhibit high closeness, high CON scores, low in-degree, and high out-degree.
Our focus in this work will be on the validation of the DCH with regards to detecting leaders;
in particular, we will focus on items (3) and (4) of the DCH. Note that while we expect leaders to
be in alliances (that is, have prominent local influence), leaders are determined via global metrics
of the network.
3 Methods and Data
3.1 Survivor
In [6], we studied the voting history of U.S. seasons of Survivor, which is a social game show where
players compete by voting each other out. In Survivor, strangers called survivors are placed in a
location and forced to provide shelter and food for themselves, with limited support from the outside
world. Survivors are split into two or more tribes which cohabit and work together. Tribes compete
for immunity and the losing tribe goes to tribal council where one of their members is voted off.
At some point during the season, tribes merge and the remaining survivors compete for individual
immunity. Survivors voted off may be part of the jury. When there are a small number of remaining
survivors who are finalists (typically two or three), the jury votes in favor of one of them to become
the Sole Survivor who receives a cash prize of one million dollars. Figure 1 represents a graphical
depiction of the voting history of a season of U.S. Survivor.
We extend the analysis of the 35 U.S. seasons in [6] to 82 international seasons of Survivor.
Data used in our analysis was obtained from the Survivor wiki pages https://survivor.fandom.com/
wiki/Main Page. Several seasons (beyond the 82) were excluded for varying reasons. In some cases,
a wiki page exists, but there was no voting data. In other cases, much of the voting information
was missing, or the rules are significantly different than the traditional version of the game shows.
Nevertheless, the number of seasons collected exceeds the number in [6].
In Table 1 we display some of the CON scores for a few example seasons. We distinguish which
players are finalists, since the rules change in determining who is the last player eliminated. For
example, instead of eliminating the last player via votes against players, in survivor many players
may return for a final vote for who they would like to win.
In Table 2, we detail relevant statistics on these networks. For each network, we consider whether
the winner of the season had one of the top three or top five CON scores and list the percentage
of such networks. For example from Table 2 we see that 81.7 percent of Survivor winners had one
of the largest 5 CON scores. For comparison, we also compute PageRank (on the reversed-edge
network, where we change the orientation of directed edge) and Jaccard similarity scores, which
are both standard ranking scores. Jaccard similarity is a type of normalized CON score; see [10].
We find that the CON scores are a more accurate predictor for determining finalists of Survivor
than both PageRank and Jaccard similarity. We observe that these results are consistent with
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Fig. 1. The Survivor Heroes vs. Healers vs. Hustlers co-voting network. Nodes are scaled by closeness, and
color-coded according to their original tribe. Thicker edges represent multiple votes.
Australian Survivor (2002)
Name ID OD C CON
Robert 5 10 0.714 44
Sciona 1 9 0.652 37
Joel 7 8 0.625 35
Katie 3 9 0.652 38
Sophie 3 8 0.652 38
Jane 9 6 0.625 36
Lance 8 5 0.577 27
Craig 8 8 0.577 18
Naomi 8 7 0.5 25
Caren 10 6 0.5 25
Sylvan 3 5 0.417 30
Deborah 4 4 0.395 23
Jeff 5 1 0.395 4
David 6 3 0.441 23
Tim 4 2 0.294 10
Lucinda 8 1 0.0 7
Robinson 2009
Name ID OD C CON
Ellenor 0 6 0.563 36
Jarmo 7 8 0.557 34
Anna 2 10 0.645 54
Nina 4 7 0.557 38
Erik Bl. 7 9 0.612 47
Lukas 4 7 0.557 31
Angela 6 8 0.612 46
Ranjit 5 5 0.51 30
Christian 3 4 0.51 24
Rafael 5 4 0.49 28
Erik Bi. 9 5 0.438 26
Erik R. 5 4 0.422 18
Mika 5 3 0.306 13
Josefine 0 2 0.265 17
Erika 7 2 0.306 15
Beatrice 6 2 0.35 12
Micha 12 1 0.299 7
Survivor South Africa Malaysia
Name ID OD C CON
Lorette 4 9 0.653 35
Grant 5 8 0.653 33
Amanda 4 8 0.622 26
Mandla 0 8 0.652 32
Angie 6 9 0.688 31
Angela 4 6 0.594 28
Dyke 4 6 0.568 17
Hein 5 4 0.484 22
Irshaad 3 5 0.544 25
Lisa 11 4 0.484 16
Rijesh 4 3 0.408 13
Nichal 6 2 0.363 12
Elsie 8 2 0.436 9
Viwe 5 2 0.344 11
Nicola 5 1 0.304 6
Nomfundo 4 1 0.335 8
Table 1. Three international Survivor seasons. Players are listed by first name, in order from top to bottom
with the winner at the top, and the first eliminated player at the bottom. For each player we list the in-
degree, out-degree, closeness, and CON score. The horizontal line separates finalists from the rest of the
group.
the analysis in [6] for the U.S. seasons. As an added comparison, we list the probability of the
winner appearing in a random set of three or five players; note that there is a range of percentages
depending on how many players are in a given season. In the interest of space, we refer the reader to
https://eikmeier.sites.grinnell.edu/uncategorized/competition-show-data/ where we house all data
on these seasons.
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CON PageRank
Jaccard
Similarity
random set
Survivor Top 3 57.3 43.9 47.6 11.1-27.3
Top 5 81.7 78.0 72.0 18.5-45.5
Table 2. Statistics on international Survivor seasons.
3.2 Political Conflicts
For our second competition network, we extracted data from The Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (or ACLED), which may be found at https://www.acleddata.com/data/. ACLED
catalogs information about political conflict and protests across the world. In these conflict networks,
nodes correspond to actors in a given region, and edges correspond to conflicts between the actors.
Many types of metadata are recorded corresponding to each event. Our particular interest is in the
actors involved in each event, and where the event took place. More information about this project
can be found on the project website.
An important note about the ACLED data is that we do not know which actor initiated a given
event. Therefore, we do not consider the majority of edges (events) to be directed. The only events
which we assume knowledge about directed-ness is when civilians are involved. We restricted our
study to a set of events to a particular country; keeping the scale at the country level allows us
to keep a larger set of actors. We selected three countries that have a large number of actors and
events to analyze: Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan.
We first consider the rankings for Pakistan with commentary.
Unidentified Armed Group (Pakistan)
TTP: Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan
Rioters (Pakistan)
Police Forces of Pakistan (2013-2018)
Military Forces of Pakistan (2013-2018)
Police Forces of Pakistan (2008-2013)
LeI: Lashkar-e-Islam
Military Forces of Pakistan (2008-2013)
Aman Lashkar
Unidentified Armed Group (Afghanistan)
Pakistan Rangers
Frontier Corps
Police Forces of Pakistan (2018-)
Islamic State (Pakistan)
BLF: Baloch Liberation Front
CON
Unidentified Armed Group (Pakistan)
TTP: Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan
Police Forces of Pakistan (2013-2018)
Military Forces of Pakistan (2013-2018)
Police Forces of Pakistan (2008-2013)
Military Forces of Pakistan (2008-2013)
Rioters (Pakistan)
Police Forces of Pakistan (2018-)
Protesters
BLF: Baloch Liberation Front
Jatoi Communal Militia (Pakistan)
Chandio Communal Militia (Pakistan)
Private Security Forces (Pakistan)
Pakistan Rangers
Military Forces of United States
PageRank
Fig. 2. A Slope Graph to compare the rankings via CON and PageRank. On the left, the top actors in the
conflict network Pakistan via CON metrics, while on the right, the top actors in Pakistan via PageRank on
the reverse network. Actors are labeled in black if the difference in rankings is less than or equal to three.
Actors are labeled in red if the CON ranking is at least four places higher than the PageRank, and in green
if the PageRank is at least 4 places higher than the CON ranking. Note that no line appears to connect the
left and right side if the actor does not show up in the top 15 of the other ranking.
Pakistan has faced terrorism activities since 2000, with many militant groups attacking civilians
and Pakistan armed forces. TTP (Pakistan) is one of the largest radical extremist groups, which is
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an umbrella organization of many militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Islam, Islamic State (Pakistan),
and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. In Figure 2, we find that TTP has one of the highest CON scores. TTP has
alliances with another terrorist organizations in Pakistan and neighboring countries, which lends
to its prominence. In addition, due to the Afghan war, TTP has a strong influence and hold over
many Islamic institutions in Pakistan. The Police Forces of Pakistan and Military Forces of Pakistan
ensure national security, and they share information for achieving their goals. The Police Forces of
Pakistan are an influential actor in the conflict network with another one of the highest CON scores.
They perform their duties in all provinces of Pakistan with the help of their paramilitary forces such
as Pakistan Rangers and Frontier Corps, and they maintain law and order, as well as border control.
Military Forces of Pakistan (2013-2018) has one of the largest CON scores owing to their increased
activities against terrorist groups in recent years.
We also offer commentary on some of the lower ranked actors. The Baloch Liberation Front
(or BLF) is an ethnic-separatist political front and militant organization that is currently fighting
against the Pakistani government for an independent Balochi state. The BLF is the strongest and
most influential militant group of Baluchistan, but there has been no confirmed coordination between
the BLF and other Balochi and non-Balochi groups, and they operate independently of one another.
This is a large reason that BLF have low CON and closeness scores. The Islamic State is a part
of the militant Islamist group: Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS). The Islamic State was
formed by some of the TTP leaders and is more successful in Afghanistan. This organization has
had less success in Pakistan largely carrying out isolated, small scale attacks. The Police Forces of
Pakistan actively participated with the support of paramilitary forces of Pakistan in 2008-2018 for
war against terror. The Police Forces of Pakistan mostly work to maintain the daily law and order
in their respective provinces. Likely for these reasons, they have lower CON scores than the years
between 2008-2018.
Taliban
Police Forces of Afghanistan (2004-)
Unidentified Armed Group (Afghanistan)
Military Forces of Afghanistan (2004-)
Islamic State (Afghanistan)
NATO
Military Forces of Afghanistan (2004-) Special Forces
HQN: Haqqani Network
Afghan Local Police
Private Security Forces (Afghanistan)
Militia (Pro-Government)
Military Forces of Pakistan (2008-)
National Directorate of Security
Taliban and/or Islamic State Afghanistan
Hezbi Islami
CON
Taliban
Military Forces of Afghanistan (2004-)
Islamic State (Afghanistan)
Police Forces of Afghanistan (2004-)
NATO
Unidentified Armed Group (Afghanistan)
Military Forces of Afghanistan (2004-) Special Forces
National Directorate of Security
HQN: Haqqani Network
Taliban and/or Islamic State Afghanistan
Afghan and/or NATO Forces
Afghan Local Police
Private Security Forces (Afghanistan)
Militia (Pro-Government)
TTP: Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan
PageRank
Fig. 3. Top actors in Afghanistan via CON score and PageRank.
We note that the ranking of the top actors using the CON score (on the left in Figure 2) is not
dissimilar to the one using PageRank on the reversed-edge network (on the right in Figure 2). To
quantify the difference in the rankings we used Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. Note that
we cannot use Pearson correlation because our data is not at all Gaussian. Recall that Spearman’s
correlation coefficient is defined as
1− 6
∑N
i=1 d
2
i
N(N2 − 1) ,
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Rioters (India)
Police Forces of India (2014-)
Unidentified Armed Group (India)
Military Forces of India (2014-)
Protestors (India)
CPI (Maoist): Communist Party of India (Maoist)
Police Forces (2014-) Rashtriya Rifles
BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party
Polices Forces (2014-) Assam Rifles
TMC: Trinamool Congress Party
INC: Indian National Congress
JJMP: Jharkhand Jan Mukti Parishad
NSCN-K: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
Police Forces (2014-) Central Reserve Force
Unidentified Armed Group (Pakistan)
CON
Police Forces of India (2014-)
Rioters (India)
Military Forces of India (2014-)
Unidentified Armed Group (India)
CPI (Maoist): Communist Party of India (Maoist)
Police Forces (2014-) Border Security Force
Protestors (India)
Police Forces (2014-) Central Reserve Force
Polices Forces (2014-) Assam Rifles
Police Forces (2014-) Rashtriya Rifles
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah
INC: Indian National Congress
BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party
Police Forces (2014-) Forest Range Officer
SAD: Shiromani Akali Dal
PageRank
Fig. 4. Top actors in India via CON score and PageRank.
where N is the total number of actors, and di is the difference in rankings between actor i. A value
close to 1 means that the two rankings are very well positively correlated. The Spearman correlation
for Pakistan is -0.341, which suggests that the rankings are not that similar. In fact, the negative
value implies that as the CON ranking decreases, the PageRank score increases. There are 741 total
actors we consider in the Pakistan data set, and the later rankings clearly vary greatly.
We finish this section with the rankings for Afghanistan and India in Figures 3 and 4. The
Spearman coefficients are 0.604 and -.267 respectively, indicating that the rankings provided by
CON matches more similarly to PageRank in the Afghanistan dataset. While we do not provide
in-depth commentary on these rankings, we find influential actors in both countries with the largest
rankings against DCH metrics.
3.3 Food Webs
As a third and final type of data that we analyzed against the DCH, we studied food web datasets
from the Pajek website: http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/data/bio/foodweb/foodweb.htm [3].
These are 14 food webs in total. In food webs, the nodes are species, and a weighted edge (u, v)
exists with weight w if u inherits carbon from v (that is, u preys on v) [2]. We interpret this as a
directed negative interaction from node u to node v. A noteworthy difference in these networks (vs.
Survivor, say) is that the movement of energy is balanced, meaning the in-degree and out-degree for
each species is equal.
Rankings of selected food web datasets are in Figures 5 and 6; the rankings for all the datasets
may be found at https://eikmeier.sites.grinnell.edu/uncategorized/competition-show-data/ along
with the computed CON scores, closeness, and PageRank on the reversed-edge network.
In studying the rankings of these 14 food webs, we see a difference between the CON rank-
ings and PageRank. PageRank has been used to study the importance of species in regards to
co-extinction [1,16,14], which we expect is likely reflected in the rankings we see here using vanilla
PageRank. However, we find a substantially different ranking when using the CON scores; for exam-
ple, see the placement of Heteroflagellates in Figure 5. The average Spearman correlation coefficient
across these 14 datasets is 0.271, and the range is between 0.004 and 0.554. (Recall that a value close
to 1 means very well correlated.) Therefore, we suggest that the CON scores are giving a different
ranking, which is much closer to trophic levels of species. In particular, the CON scores reflect a
natural hierarchical structure in ecosystems, and this is consistent with the DCH.
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Bay Anchovy
Weakfish
Hogchoker
Chrysaora
Ctenophores
Herrings and Shads
Blue Crab
White Perch
American Eel
Catfish
Meroplankton
Oysters
Suspension Feeding Benthos
Bluefish
Croaker
Striped Bass
Meiofauna
Menhaden
Spot
Microphytobenthos
Ciliates
Mesozooplankton
Deposit Feeding Benthos
Rotifers
SAV
Heteroflagellates
CON
Heteroflagellates
Deposit Feeding Benthos
Rotifers
Oysters
Meroplankton
Chrysaora
Blue Crab
Suspension Feeding Benthos
Ciliates
White Perch
Catfish
Herrings and Shads
Hogchoker
Ctenophores
Microphytobenthos
American Eel
Bay Anchovy
Weakfish
Bluefish
Croaker
Meiofauna
Menhaden
Mesozooplankton
SAV
Spot
Striped Bass
PageRank
Fig. 5. The Chesapeake Bay Lower food web dataset. On the left, organisms are listed in decreasing order,
with the largest CON score at the top. On the right, organisms are listed by decreasing PageRank score.
4 Conclusion and future directions
We studied an implication of the Dynamic Competition Hypothesis (DCH) for competition networks
across several different types of real-world networks. We found that the DCH prediction that high
CON scores should correspond to leaders is supported in predicting winners in international seasons
of Survivor, in predicting species with high trophic level species in food web, and for determining
influential actors in conflict networks in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. Metrics such as CON
scores outperformed PageRank as an indicator of influential actors in the competition networks we
studied.
While our results provide support for the DCH, more work needs to be done. We did not address
items (1) and (2) of the DCH regarding alliances in our data sets, and that would be an important
next step. Another direction is to consider an aggregate score, based on the CON score, closeness,
and in- and out-degree, as a measure of detecting leaders in competition networks. An interesting
direction would be to study more closely the dynamic aspects of competition networks, analyzing
them over time to predict leaders. For example, we could analyze the co-voting network of Survivor
of each episode of a season, and determine if temporal trends in network statistics predict finalists.
An open question is whether CON score centrality is applicable to large-scale networks exhibiting
adversarial interactions, such as in Epinions and Slashdot (which give rise to signed data sets with
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Silverside
Goldspotted Killifish
Gulf Flounder
Longnosed Killifish
Sheepshead Killifish
Needlefish
Pinfish
Sheepshead
Silver Jenny
Gulf Killifish
Bay Anchovy
Mullet
Moharra
Blacktip Shark
Stingray
Striped Anchovy
Benthic Invertebrates
Zooplankton
CON
Stingray
Blacktip Shark
Silverside
Benthic Invertebrates
Silver Jenny
Goldspotted Killifish
Gulf Flounder
Bay Anchovy
Moharra
Sheepshead
Striped Anchovy
Longnosed Killifish
Zooplankton
Mullet
Sheepshead Killifish
Needlefish
Gulf Killifish
Pinfish
PageRank
Fig. 6. The CrystalC food web dataset. On the left, organisms are listed in decreasing order, with the largest
CON score at the top. On the right, organisms are listed by decreasing PageRank score.
tens of thousands of nodes, and available from [13]). Epinions was an on-line consumer review site,
where users could trust or distrust each other. Slashdot is a social network that contains friend and
foe links. A challenge with these data sets from the view of validating the DCH is that there is no
inherently defined ranking, as there is in Survivor (via the order contestants were voted off), food
webs (trophic level), and in conflict graphs (via political and strategic influence).
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